This free page contains the context needed to interpret the published static score. Deep review and runtime validation are separate evidence levels, not hidden score modifiers or certifications.
AI Security ToolStatic Score 78Static AssessedFresh
78Static score out of 100
Current posture summary
The pinned garak snapshot scored 78 under the static AI baseline. All four required evidence providers completed with no unexpected scope gaps; the result describes repository-visible posture and does not test runtime behavior.
All four required static evidence providers completed successfully.
No unexpected static controls were left unassessed, and repository evidence supported the assessed agentic, data-exposure, observability, and evidence-readiness controls.
Evidence-backed weaknesses
Multiple workflows reference third-party GitHub Actions by mutable version tags rather than immutable full commit SHAs.
The repository-posture dimension scored 31, lower than its other static dimensions in this snapshot.
Limits and next action
Twelve expected controls outside static reach—including prompt injection, authorization, isolation, exfiltration, and resource-limit behavior—were not assessed.
Dependency-update automation and workflow-permission observations were not promoted into public findings because their evidence or severity was not sufficiently established for publication.
Documentation, configuration, and code markers are not proof that controls remain effective in a deployed runtime.
Editorial adjudication was AI-assisted project-owner review, not independent certification or human ground truth.
Remediation guidance
Pin third-party GitHub Actions to reviewed full commit SHAs while retaining readable release tags in comments.
Validate dependency-update coverage and least-privilege workflow permissions with exact workflow evidence before publishing further claims.
Use selective runtime testing to evaluate prompt-injection resistance, tool authorization, secret isolation, exfiltration boundaries, output handling, resource limits, and security telemetry.
No reviewed public case file is attached.
Public-safe finding summaries
medium
Build workflow dependencies use mutable references
Repository workflows reference third-party Actions by mutable version tags, including actions/checkout@v3 and actions/setup-python@v4, rather than immutable full commit SHAs. This is a static build-integrity weakness, not evidence of compromise.